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FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM: A WINDING
ROAD
Hon. Richard D. Cudahy*

Abstract
Three great economic shtfts have shaken the world in the last thirty orfory years. The
Soviet Union, the torch-bearer of socialism, after engaging in an inner-generatedperestroika
(reconstruction),increasingy veered toward a strongerrole for the market until it moved to fullblown capitalism. At about the same time, China, another beacon of socialism, also moved
inexorably toward a socialistmarket economy and eventually to a virtualy capitalistapproach.
But the Soviet Union, now fragmented, with the Russian Republic its remainingflagsh ,
moved politically toward an imperfect democrag and suffered a painful economic decline.
Meanwhile, China retained the authoritarianrule of the Communist Pary infull control and
its reaction to the change was suprisinglyfavorable with spectaculargrowth and remarkable
prospects. And while these profound transitions rocked the sodalist powers, the US, the
capitalist titan, together with the whole capitalist world, suffered its own slide into sudden
recession with severe hardshj, unemployment and exploding fscal defdts. This Article
explores the ramfications and relationship involved in these various and contrasting
developments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been two cosmic collapses of contrasting
economic systems: first, the socialist system involving the former Soviet Union
and its Eastern European allies experienced a rather sudden decline and crisis
and was transformed painfully into a part of the world capitalist system.' Later
the world economy, predominantly capitalist in character and led by the US,
entered an abrupt decline, which is still ongoing as I write.2 Meanwhile, a third
economic entity, China, nominally socialist, but trending toward capitalism,
experienced part of the world-wide decline but displayed remarkable health and
resilience and was thought by many to be moving to a leading position in the
world.' All this may be telling us something about capitalism and socialism, their
futures in the world, and, more generally, about the role of government in the
dominant economies of the future. To explore these issues we will first examine
the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and related systems. Then we will
examine contemporary events in China, where some but not all the same forces
and counterforces were at work but with strikingly different results. In contrast
with these Soviet and Chinese experiences, we will explore the financial crisis
and economic decline in the US and its consequences. Finally, we will attempt to
determine what comparative analysis can tell us about policy trends and our
policy choices in the years ahead.
II. SOCIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION
Until about 1975, the health of the Soviet planned economy was not in
such serious question that anyone feared its collapse. Its growth rate since at
least 1928 had been robust, even though experts might quarrel about its precise
strength4 However, the economy had obvious areas of weakness. One such area
was agriculture, where collectivization had apparently led to declining
productivity and an inability to meet the needs of the country for food. Further,
the efficiency and productivity of the economy, in contrast to its maintenance of
I
2

See Prem Shankar Jha, The PerilousRoad to the Market: The PoliticalEconomy of Reform in Russia, India
and China 36-38 (Pluto 2002).
Consider Richard A. Posner, A Failureof Capitaism: The Crisis of '08 and the Descent into Depression

3

See Jha, The Perilous Road to the Market at 89 (cited in note 1).

(Harvard 2009).
4

5

See David Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System 36 (Roudedge
1997).
See Andrei A. Baev, The Privatiationof Land in Russia: Reforms and Impediments, 17 Loyola LA Intl &
Comp L Rev 1, 12-13 (1994).
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gross levels of production, could be cast in doubt. Particularly in later years,
there were obvious concerns about the environmental impact of economic
activity.
Another unarguable defect of the economy was its apparent inability to
manufacture consumer goods (or even capital goods) of passable quality.
According to one informed estimate and viewing matters most indulgently, only
seventeen to eighteen percent of Soviet manufactures were of a quality
corresponding to world standards and exportable to the West! This was a
serious deficiency because, among other things, it sharply limited the potential
for hard currency export earnings based on the sale of manufactured goods.
Significant exports were limited to natural resources-primarily oil and gas.'
Russia and its associated lands were well endowed with resources, but resource
prices were dictated by international forces and were beyond domestic control,
or even significant influence, leaving the domestic economy at the mercy of
international price trends. This was an important factor in Soviet and Russian
economic trends in the 1980s and beyond. ' On the other hand, if Russian
manufacturing had been capable of meeting international standards there is
every reason to believe that foreign trade could have been stabilized and the
impact of world prices on the Soviet economy reduced. Another related
problem in the Soviet economy was the persistent shortage of consumer goods
in the domestic channels of distribution.'0 This problem was in part related to
manufacturing inadequacies, but also to the failure of prices to reflect demand."
In any event, before about 1975, growth rates were satisfactory and there
was no general concern that the Soviet economy was headed for decline or
collapse.12 These circumstances were reflected not only in the thinking of the
Soviet leadership but in Western, and specifically American, quarters as well.
6

See Douglas Lind, The Crane, the Swamp, and the Melancholy: Nature and Nihilism in Soviet
EnvironmentalLiterature and Law, 23 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Poly 381, 383-87 (2009).

7

See Kotz and Weir, Revolution from Above at 41-42 (cited in note 4); Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's
Strugglefor Economic Reform: The Soviet Reform Process, 1985-1988 17 (Pinter 1989).
See William G. Frenkel and Michael Y. Sukhman, New ForeignInvestment Regimes of Russia and Other
Republics of the Former U.S.S.R: A Legislative Anaysis and HistoricalPerspecve, 16 BC Intl & Comp L
Rev 321, 322-23 (1993).

9

10
11

12

See Yegor Gaidar, The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil, (American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Apr 19, 2007), online at http://www.aei.org/issue/25991 (visited Apr 30, 2010).
See George L. Priest, The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy, 103 Yale L J
2259, 2271 (1994).
See Janos Kornai, The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Realty, in Victor Nee and David
Stark, eds, Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe 41-42 (Stanford
1989).
Consider Gertrude E. Schroeder, Reflections on Economic Sovietology, 11 Post-Soviet Affairs 197
(1995).
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There was still great concern in the West that the Soviet Union might eventually
succeed in overwhelming its rivals, and this attitude certainly did not suggest any
general expectation that the Soviet economy was on the verge of collapse." In
addition, most observers in the West were still impressed with Soviet
accomplishments in space and in other military and quasi-military spheres, where
various achievements were quite notable in contrast to obvious deficiencies in
the consumer area. Hindsight has led to a general belief that the Soviet economy
collapsed of its own weight in 1990, but, despite its deficiencies, it is difficult to
make a case for an obvious fatal decline extending many years into the past and
giving clear warning of collapse. 14
Why then did the Soviet socialist economy enter into a period of instability
after about 1985 and eventually show signs of failure and collapse? How did
these events relate to comparable events in China? And were these
developments related in any way to the subsequent crisis in the US economy?
What lessons are to be drawn from these respective collapses and what do they
portend for future economic developments in the world?
The first development leading to the downhill Soviet slide after 1985 was a
gradual decline in the Soviet economic growth rate after 1975." Until about
then, nothing seemed radically amiss except for the problem areas already noted.
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union; in effect, the leading figure of that country." He, like
others, was aware of the declining growth rate and of other indications that the
economy and the country were in need of energizing. So he set out to reform
the economy and the political system as well. This was to be done through
perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (openness)." But Gorbachev's thinking
did not include a withdrawal from socialism. In fact, he was a dedicated socialist
and continued in that faith even when his country renounced it."
Gorbachev's demands could be summarized by the slogan "acceleration of
He emphasized the need for qualitative
economic development.""
13

Id.

14

See Kotz and Weir, Revolutionfmm Above at 226-35 (cited in note 4).
Consider Robert C. Allen, The Rise and Decline ofthe Soviet Economy, 34 Can

15

16

J Econ 859

(2001).

18

See Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Kremlin's Eye: The 21st Centug Prokuratura in the Russian
AuthoritarianTradiion, 45 Stan J Intl L 1, 10 (2009).
See Veronika V. Kravchouk, New Religious Movements and the Problem of Extremism in Modem Russia,
2004 BYU L Rev 507, 510 (2004).
See Alexander Yakoviev, Russia: The Struggle for a Constitution, 7 Emory Intl L Rev 277, 283-84

19

(1993); Aslund, Gorbachev's Strugglefor Economic Reform at 182-87 (cited in note 7); Kotz and Weir,
Revolutionfm Above at 152 (cited in note 4).
See Vladimir D. Shkolnikov, ModerniZationand Russian Democrag, 29 Fletcher Forum World Affairs

17

21, 21 (2005).
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improvements: an increase in efficiency and quality, an acceleration of the
scientific-technical program and better use of the existing potential. He thought
that "[c]ompetition should be organised[sic] so that it was oriented not towards
gross production but 'even work rhythm, timely fulfillment of contract
obligations, high product quality, introduction of new technology, prudent
utilization of working time, raw materials and money."' 20 He decried the lack of
balance between supply and demand. He particularly emphasized improvements
in agriculture, which had been his specialty, as a place for reform to begin.21
Significantly, he favored changes in the political system, developing socialist
democracy and openness of information, competition of ideas and selfmanagement and self-government.
The relationship of the political to the economic has been a key problem
for Soviet-style socialism since the beginning. Socialism, as prescribed by Marx,
was primarily an economic doctrine. In the Soviet context, its political
dimension, which as things developed became its most controversial, was
supplied by Lenin. Democratic centralism, monopoly of power by the ruling
party, the leading role played by the party, the arbitrary application of power, and
the extraordinary disregard of human rights were all earmarks of this Soviet
political system, inspired by Lenin.22 Presumably, one of the prime motivations
of Gorbachev, in his search for reform, was to change the political system to
adopt many of the values of Western democracy, including the rule of law.
Gorbachev was trained as a lawyer, and respect for the rule of law was a value
that sprang naturally from his background. 23 He aspired to democratic socialism,
socialism with a human face, and, not incidentally, a more efficient socialism. 24
Of course, there are many in the West and elsewhere who aspire to a
democratic socialism and who in fact ascribe the failures of socialism to the
political path chosen by Lenin. These observers fervently believe that, with a
firmly democratic polity, even classical socialism could succeed. Presumably,
they would be of the view that Gorbachev was on the right path, and left to his
own devices could have steered the Soviets back to a winning course of
development. There are, of course, also those who take precisely the opposite

20

21

Aslund, Gorbachev'sStrugglefor Economic Reform at 27 (cited in note 7) (citing Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
Izbrannye rechi i stati, Vol 2 at 91 (Politizdat, Moscow 1987)).
See Jha, The Perilous Road to the Market at 27 (cited in note 1); Aslund, Gorbachev's Strugge for
Economic Reform at 29 (cited in note 7).

22

See Kotz and Weir, Revolution from Above at 18-20 (cited in note 4).

23

See Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 Ga J Intl & Comp L 511, 515
(2008).
See Carlton Herzog, Note, Ramparts and Palisades:ArchetpalStructures in Hostile Battles for Corporate
Control, 42 Rutgers L Rev 817, 828 n 65 (1990).

24
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view, those orthodox Communists who believe that only a Leninist political
structure can successfully manage a genuinely socialist society. Presumably, those
folks are in charge in Cuba and China today. This is a debate that cannot be
resolved within the limits of the present discussion. However, one must wonder
whether the eventual failure of Gorbachev's pursuit of a democratic socialism
did not demonstrate some of the eventual unrealism of his aspiration: whether in
the end either socialism or democracy had to yield. In Russia, it was first
socialism that gave way, and subsequently genuine democracy. Of course, there
have been many regimes in the West that were at least nominally socialist
without departing from democratic practice, but their socialism would not have
been recognized as such by socialists of the Soviet stripe. In any event, the
focused, inflexible and doctrinaire socialist faith of followers of Lenin is difficult
to fuse with genuinely democratic practice.
The progress of Gorbachev's reforms encountered the persistent
opposition of the entrenched officialdom of the Communist Party (obviously
with some exceptions) and at the same time was joined by reformers, many of
who went beyond Gorbachev and many of who sought to modify socialism in
ways that challenged its essential character.2 6 In the end, Boris Yeltsin took the
play away from Gorbachev and pursued a course that was unabashedly capitalist
(but was not proclaimed to be such).27
In the first year of his announced reform course, Gorbachev received little
effective or articulate support from the Communist Party, as represented by the
27th Party Congress. But subsequently the Law on Individual Labor Activity and
independent state quality control were adopted by the governing organs. 28 A
little later, a draft Law on State Enterprises was published.2 ' Reformers had been
speaking of a law on socialist enterprises as an attempt to reduce the weight of
central economic control agencies, but the results here were ambiguous.

25

See id at 63-72.

26

28

See Steven M. Spaeth, The Detgulation of Transportationand Natural Gas Production in the United States
and its Relevance to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, 12 U Bridgeport L Rev 43, 92
(1991).
See Dina M. Bernardelli, Note, Russian Rule-Ette: Using Khodorkovsky's Criminal Trial to Assess the
State ofRussia'sjudiiday, 31 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 85, 86 (2008).
See Amy J. Bliss, Proletariatto Perestroika: A Comparison of Labor Law in the Soviet Union and the

29

Russian Federation, 18 Comp Lab L J 264, 286-87 (1997).
See Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Instituion: The Transition in Russia from State Arbitra.h Courts, 46

27

Am J Comp L 93, 94 n 8 (1998).
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Gorbachev continued his campaign, and, of course, despite the opposition his
voice always commanded wide attention.30
A vigorous campaign against alcohol was instituted in 1985, but was so
effective that it affected national income and was thereby a cause for concern.3
In addition, quality control (of manufacturing)-a concern since the mid1970s-had been strongly reinforced in 1985 but resulted in reduced production
and therefore met with mixed approval and support.3 2 Self-financing the use of
funds generated by enterprises for investment where they were generated was
also the subject of trial applications under Gorbachev. Of course, a dominant
objective of the Gorbachev efforts was to increase the rate of economic growth,
and this was written into the Five Year Plan adopted in 1985."
The first real (and more fundamental) efforts at economic reform were
adopted in 1987: a series of decrees surrounding the Law on State Enterprise,
which were intended to democratize and decentralize the system and to leave
more decision-making in the hands of the day-to-day managers and workers.34
The output of enterprises was still to consist of some state orders fixed by the
planners but otherwise what was produced and to whom it was sold were to be
determined by the enterprises. Prices, however, largely remained under state
control.35 Thus, Gorbachev tried to introduce market concepts as part of his
reform agenda. But shortages of consumer goods began to develop as the funds
in consumer hands grew (partly from diversion of investment funds to employee
compensation) and the amount of available goods being produced held steady or
was reduced (and prices remained constant)." A sizable government deficit also
developed as a result of declining revenues attributable to the anti-alcohol
campaign, the 1987 Law on State Enterprise and other factors. The deficit was
met by the printing of more money, which in turn added to the imbalance
between supply and demand. At the same time the rate of investment declined
because it was no longer dictated by the Plan and enterprises failed to take up
30

See Kotz and Weir, Revolution from Above at 78, 92 (cited in note 4); Anders Aslund, Russia's
CapitalistRevolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democray Failed54-56 (Peterson Institute for
International Economics 2007).

31

Consider Daniel Tarschys, The Success of a Failure: Gorbachev'sAlcohol Poif, 1985-88, 45 EuropeAsia Stud 7 (1993).

32

See Aslund, Gorbachev'sStrugglefor Economic Reform at 76-80 (cited in note 7).

33

See Kotz and Weir, Revolutionfrom Above at 77-82 (cited in note 4).

34

See Christopher M. Pilkerton, Changing the Chameleon: A New Approach to the Investigation of
TransnationalOrgani.Zed Crime, 10 Intl Legal Perspectives 247, 270 (1998); Aslund, Russia's Capitalist
Revolution at 54-56 (cited in note 30).

35

See Alexander Yakovlev, Russia: The Struggle for a Constitution, 7 Emory Intl L Rev 277, 283-84
(1993).

36

See Bernard H. Siegan, Conserving and Developing the Land, 27 San Diego L Rev 279, 280 n 4 (1990).
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the slack-apparently more concerned about today's results than about
tomorrow's needs.
Shortages of consumer goods-particularly basic ones-and diversion to
the black market grew and the consumer crisis deepened. Moving far beyond
Gorbachev's original demands, radical economists and the media began to speak
in terms of a "socialist market economy" and a "planned market economy,"
implying that the economy should become primariy a market economy.38 In
1990, the term regulated market economy came into use, perhaps suggestive of its
use in a capitalist context. Finally, the term "free market" came into use,
suggesting a state of affairs that did not really exist anywhere. 39 By 1990, the
status of property was being argued in the media, with increasing support for
private property and for a mixed economy, which would include small-scale
cooperative and individual enterprises. Then there were demands for equal
status for all forms of property. From here, discussion moved on to
privatization, meaning the conversion of state enterprises into capitalist
companies. 0 During this period, Gorbachev seemed to favor a faster pace for
perestroika but he did not support the privatization of industry.41 Meanwhile,
Boris Yeltsin had been elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Republic, where he was a rival to Gorbachev. A team of economists containing
adherents of Gorbachev and Yeltsin produced the 500 Day Plan, which called
for the drastic transformation of the Soviet economy in 500 days.42 The Plan
envisioned a great deal of privatization, encouraged foreign investment and
called for a financial system based on private commercial banks and securities
markets.4 3 The Plan also called for the rapid freeing of many prices. It was
moving without delay toward capitalism. At first Gorbachev seemed to agree to
this Plan, but he later rejected it, while Yeltsin and the parliament of the Russian
Republic approved it."
Shortages of consumer goods became increasingly acute as output in the
economy failed to grow and then contracted, investment dropped and the

37
38
39

See Jha, The Perilous Road to the Market at 24-33 (cited in note 1).
See Kotz and Weir, Revolutionfrm Above at 83-90 (cited in note 4).

41

See id at 85.
See Frenkel and Sukhman, New Foreign Investment Regimes of Russia and Other Republics of the Former
U.S.S.R. (cited in note 8) (noting that "[t]hroughout 1990, more than twenty pieces of legislation
concerning companies, privatization, property, currency, and pricing were passed").
See Roger Barrett James, Comment, Information-The Key to Fair Privatigation:Briish Successes and

42

Russian Pifalls, 20 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J 837, 858 (1998).
See id at 857-58.

43

See id.

44

See Kotz and Weir, Revolutionfmm Above at 89-90 (cited in note 4).
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budget deficit seemed beyond control.45 It was an economic crisis. In 1991, the
governments of the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies had fallen and their
economies were reoriented toward the West, causing a sharp decline in Soviet
foreign trade. At the same time, the republics in the borderlands of the Soviet
Union were restive and breaking away, so Russia lost much of its area and some
of its resources. While the Soviet Union was undergoing the trauma of reform, it
was also suffering from external economic problems that added to its distress.
Some of this had its origins in the chronic shortfall of collectivized agriculture
and the need to import grain. This, in turn, resulted in a requirement for a
countervailing export surplus. Since Soviet exports were primarily natural
resources, and specifically oil and gas, export earnings were heavily dependent
on the world oil price, which fluctuated widely in the 1980s and 1990s. 4 6 During
this period, in addition, some of the Eastern European satellites of the Soviet
Union had accumulated a heavy indebtedness to Western banks.47 In order to
meet the hard currency needs of its own citizens, a problem exacerbated by a
low oil price, and the needs of its allies and socialist trading partners, the Soviet
Union was in need of hard currency funds. This might be met by borrowings
from Western sources or even by government aid from Western nations. In
either case, the Soviet Union would have to maintain good relations with the
West and deal with questions of economic reform and questions involving its
non-Russian republics and their aspirations for independence in ways that were
satisfactory to the West. The Soviets were thus not free to take measures that
would antagonize the West, and their parlous financial condition made this quite
clear. Gorbachev's pursuit of policies of detente fit in well with the prospect of
financial aid from the West.48
III. LEAVING SOCIALISM BEHIND
Yeltsin had been named Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Republic parliament. In 1991, he won a popular election to become President of
the Russian Republic.49 Presumably, he favored movement toward capitalism,
but this was not his electoral platform and polls at the time still showed majority
popular support for socialism. There were several major strikes by coal miners
from 1989-1991, and the coal miners supported Yeltsin. A referendum in 1991
45

Consider Michael Burawoy and Kathryn Hendley, Between Perestroika and Privati.Zation: Divided
Strategies and PoliticalCrisis in a Soviet Enterprise,44 Soviet Studies 371 (1992).

46

See Jha, The Perilous Road to the Market at 23 (cited in note 1).

47

See Kathleen Woody, Soviet Banking and Finance 103-51 (Woodhead-Faulkner 1990).

48

See Kotz and Weir, Revolutionfrom Above at 90-95 (cited in note 4).

49

See Cindy Skach, The 'Newest" Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 Intl
(2007).
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showed strong popular support for preservation of the Soviet Union and a new
Union treaty was negotiated granting important powers to the republics but
preserving some sort of union. Before this treaty could be signed, conservative
Communist forces, including the military, attempted a coup, placing Gorbachev
under house arrest and moving troops into Moscow to attack the White House,
the seat of the Russian parliament. 0 Boris Yeltsin led defending forces from the
top of a tank and the coup was crushed in a few days." This established the
ascendancy of Yeltsin. Before the end of 1991, Gorbachev resigned as President
of the Soviet Union. On December 31, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.52
In Russia, the Yeltsin government instituted "shock therapy," the purpose
of which was to move to capitalism as quickly as possible, and the results were,
to say the least, shocking. Price controls were immediately removed from most
wholesale and retail prices-prices immediately tripled. Government spending
was slashed.5 4 Privatization of state-owned companies proceeded rapidly.
Within two years, most firms were in the private sector. Meanwhile, industrial
production fell steeply across the board and price inflation proved very difficult
to contain." This, of course, resulted in large declines in income both by wage
earners and pensioners. Despite the poverty visited on the mass of the
population by shock therapy, a substantial elite (including many members of the
former Party leadership and bureaucracy) profited immensely from the
privatization process and from other aspects of the move into capitalism.
Under Yeltsin, a whole new class of wealthy oligarchs rose to prominence and
became an important force in the economy." All of this, of course, opened a
huge wealth gap and much obvious inequality. These developments and the
accompanying loosening of the political structure brought with them an upsurge
so
51

See Sam Blay, Self-Determinaion:A Reassessment in the Post-Communist Era,22 Deny J Intl L & Poly
275, 288 (1994).
See Kim Lane, Guardiansof the Constitution: ConstitutionalCourt Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of

52

Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U Pa L Rev 1757, 1793 (2006).
See Kotz and Weir, Revolution from Above at 131-55 (cited in note 4).

s3

See Bernard S. Black and Anna S. Tarassova, InstitutionalReform in Transition:A Case Study of Russia,
10 Sup Ct Econ Rev 211 (2003); Steven A. Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's New Fiasco:
Globaligationas Exhibit B in the Casefor a New Law and Economics, 24 Mich J Intl L 831, 839 (2003);
Aslund, Russia's Capitalist Revolution at 144-46 (cited in note 30).

54

See Steve Campbell, Comment, Brother, Can You Spare a Ruble? The Development of Bankruptcy
Legislation in the New Russia, 10 Bankr Dev J 343, 344 (1994).

55
56

See Bernardelli, Russian Rule-ette at 86 (cited in note 27).
See William J. Kovatch, Jr., Comment, Joining the Club: Assessing Russia's Applicationfor Accession to
the World Trade OrganiZaion,71 Temp L Rev 995, 1022 (1998).

57

See Campbell, Brother, Can You Spare a Ruble? at 344 (cited in note 54).
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See id.
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of crime and lawlessness and the prominence of the Russian Mafia.s" Eventually,
after Putin succeeded Yeltsin, the media was subjected to increasing restrictions
and the power of the oligarchs was crushed.o Much has been written about
shock therapy and its supposed benefits, as well as its obvious painful costs. It is
of particular interest in contrast to the generally more gradual approaches
pursued in China. Recourse to shock therapy was attributed in part to the advice
of the International Monetary Fund, Harvard advisers and, specifically,
Professor Jeffrey Sachs. One of the impacts of shock therapy under the Yeltsin
regime was the political revival of the Communist Party."
It is difficult to appraise the extent to which the mass of the Russian
people welcomed the transformation of their socialist economy to capitalism.
Certainly, they did not celebrate shock therapy and it is impossible to know to
what extent the growth of political freedom was sufficient compensation for
whatever economic deprivation marked the transition to capitalism. Eventually,
the influence of Putin and the effect of higher oil prices caused the economy to
stabilize and indicators pointed to increasing public satisfaction. On the other
hand, democracy was marginalized and political freedom (particularly as
reflected in freedom of the press) was put under stress. 62
In analyzing the causes and consequences of the collapse of socialism in
the Soviet sphere and the reaction of the Soviet populace to this economic
earthquake, one must be careful to distinguish the economic from the political
since socialism in Russia brought with it the Leninist authoritarian state and, of
course, there continues to be controversy whether socialism of the Soviet
character necessarily implies a Leninist political structure. Communist
economics is overwhelmingly unpopular in the West, but it has features that no
doubt contributed to the limited acceptance that it enjoyed in the Soviet Union.
One of those attractive features is the typically low level of unemployment.
The recent financial crisis in the capitalist world brought with it a level of
unemployment that the public finds quite unacceptable, and in the much worse
collapse in the Great Depression of the 1930s, widespread and severe
unemployment brought about a rise in the popularity of socialism in the West

59

See Georgi Arbatov, Ongins and Consequences of 'Shock Therapy, in Lawrence R. Klein and Marshall
Power, eds, The New Russia: Transition Gone Ary 171, 173-75 (2001).

60

See Ethan S. Burger and Mary Holland, Law as Poitics: The Russian Procuragand its Investzgative
Committee, 2 Colum J E Eur L 143, 151-52 (2008).

61

See Jha, The Perilous Road to the Market at 36, 65-66 (cited in note 1).

62

See Andrew Jack, Inside Putin'sRussia: Can There Be Reform aithoutDemocray?334 (Granta 2006).

63

See Kornai, The HungananReform Process at 81 (cited in note 11).
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that has not been equaled since.64 So, at least potentially, an attractive feature of
socialism is the claimed absence of unemployment, which, barring very unusual
conditions, seems to be an enduring tendency of a socialist economy.
Other aspects of socialist economies that have evoked popular support
have been free education (even at higher levels) and free medical care. So,
although socialism of the Soviet genre has not generally achieved popularity in
the West, it has from time to time exhibited economic aspects that many in the
West have found appealing. However, the main grounds for Western abhorrence
of Communism in the Soviet Union has been its Leninist political complexion
and, in particular, the arbitrary authoritarian face that it has displayed to the
world. The horrors of Stalin's homicidal terror, against which there is no
guarantee in the Soviet system, are the ultimate examples of what was
unacceptable in Soviet political practice. But even the much milder measures of
lesser authoritarians have offended Western standards of human and civil
rights."6
The key question, of course, is whether Marxist economics necessarily
carries with it arbitrary and authoritarian politics. 67 One of Gorbachev's goals
was the achievement of a more democratic socialism presumably recognizing the
rule of law. There are many millions throughout the world today that would
recognize this as a worthy and achievable goal. But I think one would have to
recognize that there is a real question whether a genuinely socialist organization
of the economy could survive in a genuinely democratic political environment.
Certainly, there is no assurance that anti-socialist influences could be brought to
heel by majority vote, and, in fact, the opposite is more likely: various aspects of
socialism could be reversed by majority vote. This is one of the prime reasons
that Lenin and his colleagues opted for authoritarianism in the first place. Of
course, various regimes purporting to be socialist have survived in various
Western countries. But none of these pursued a policy that really enforced
ownership of industry exclusively by government with private ownership
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prohibited. Whether such a regime could survive in a genuinely democratic
environment is a more difficult question."
Viewing matters from a slightly different perspective, one may ask whether
a socialist regime is more likely to be successfully managed by an authoritarian or
by a democratic government. As indicated above, Gorbachev's objective was at
least in part to make the socialist economy in the Soviet Union more popular
and successful by increasing democratic management." At least, this was the
goal of glasnost or openness-the dispersion of information about the
functioning of government and the economy to the public. Gorbachev, of
course, pursued other, more purely economic, reform goals, but never to the
extent of abandoning what he thought to be basic socialist principles, like the
public ownership of the means of production. But he was also committed to an
underlying democratization of the economic process." There are many,
including his opponents at the time, who regarded his approach as a fool's
errand, but there are many others who regard it as an attempt to achieve the
ultimate potential of socialism.n How the dictatorship of the proletariat could be
transformed into "true" democracy is never made clear.72
While the Soviet Union was engaged in efforts to perfect and/or to
abandon socialism, its subject peoples in Europe were struggling to escape
Russian tutelage and to dispense with Russian traditions of government. Led by
Hungary in the intellectual sphere and Poland in the practical, these countries,
which were essentially spoils of the Second World War, struggled and squirmed
to establish their freedom. They looked beyond their most recent defeat in the
Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia to engage in classic stirrings in Poland. The
decisive element was the decision of the Soviets in the German Democratic
Republic and elsewhere to keep Soviet troops in barracks and to refuse to
intervene on behalf of Communist governments threatened by popular
resistance.73 Since the establishment and maintenance of these governments
depended on the actual or potential armed support of the Soviet Union,
withdrawal of support was decisive. 74 The loss of its Eastern European allies by
the Soviets was followed by the fragmentation of the Union itself when various
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borderland republics sought and achieved their independence." These included
the relatively wealthy Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, certain of
the Transcaucasian republics and large Central Asian Muslim lands, leaving the
Russian Republic with half of the population but still extending over numerous
time zones from West to East.
So events following economic reform in Soviet Union not only brought
about radical change in the organization of that state and its economy, but
contributed directly or indirectly to an abrupt loss of its power and prestige in
the world. Whether this collapse of the Soviet Union can be described as a
"failure" of socialism in the same sense as Judge Posner has entitled his book a
"failure of capitalism"76 is, of course, questionable. That there was enough
dissatisfaction with the Soviet economy (and government structure) in influential
circles to lead to radical change is undeniable. There is still some debate between
those who blame the system as reformed and those who believe that the reforms
themselves (or at least some of them) were at the heart of the problem. The
"end of history" school of thought seemed to believe that the collapse of the
Soviet Union signaled the final defeat of socialism, marking the culmination of
the final ideological battle of modern times. Events since then, including what
Judge Posner has called the "failure of capitalism," have thrown some doubt on
the finality and extent of socialism's defeat, but the full significance of the
demise of the Soviets is a conundrum that we are still struggling with (and is one
of the primary points of this paper). Before we try to come directly to grips with
this issue, we must digress to explore contemporary developments in China. As
we shall see, one of the issues reflecting on the collapse of the Soviet Union that
are raised by developments in China is whether the Soviets could have reformed
their economy while retaining their authoritarian political structure.
IV. CONTEMPORARY EVENTS IN CHINA
Although China began, after the Communist seizure of power in 1949, to
follow in general the Soviet path to socialism (but, in the parlance of the day,
"with Chinese characteristics"), it soon introduced other variants of its own.
These included letting the Hundred Flowers Bloom (temporarily permitting
relatively free expression to the intellectuals) and the Great Leap Forward
(attempting ultra-rapid growth of production), both of which followed the
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directions of Chairman Mao, who was the ideological and strategic helmsman."
His final contribution was the Cultural Revolution, a drastic assault on the
Communist Establishment and intelligentsia by youthful Red Guards seeking to
upset conventional expectations.79 The disruption attendant on the Cultural
Revolution may have rendered suspect any radical adventures and certainly eased
the way of those attracted by the "Capitalist Road."" In any event, Mao died in
1976 and, after a struggle among his designated successors, events led to the
recognized ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping. Like Mao, Deng was a member of the
revolutionary generation. However, Deng was a person of a distinctly pragmatic
orientation not given to visionary schemes like the Cultural Revolution. Like
Gorbachev, Deng sought economic reform but steered clear of departures from
Leninist governing principles-the Party and its designated leaders were in
control. The flexibility of the Chinese in economic matters seemed to far exceed
the Soviets, but, as indicated, China was disinclined to political experiments
except at the local level."' Early in Deng's regime, the Chinese rid themselves of
the collectivized agriculture that had so long been the bane of the Soviets and
turned essentially to family farming.8 2 China also adopted a dual-track pricing
system, under which there was a fixed price for all products produced under the
plan, but production in excess of that was priced at market." This was in line
with Chinese inclinations to proceed with deliberation and caution and certainly
to stay clear of shock therapy.84 The Chinese also refrained from abrupt
privatization-in fact, they struggled for ideological reasons over this issue and
privatization failed to make real headway until the death of Deng in 1997.ss
One feature of the Chinese reform was the growth of township and village
enterprises, slipping occasionally into private ownership, but clearly marking the
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prevalence of gradualism. Another feature of the Chinese reform was the
dedication of areas in certain Eastern coastal provinces as Special Economic
Zones where foreign-owned factories and enterprises were invited to locate.
Whatever may have been the contrast in approaches between the Soviet Union
and China, the differences in results were dramatic: the Soviet Union collapsed
as a great power while China surged to prominence as perhaps the coming
leading economic power in the world. What can account for this contrast in
destinies of powers characterized as "socialist," no matter what the specifics of
their economic arrangements? As both these nations emerged into the new
millennium, Russia-the principal remnant of the Soviet Union-was nominally,
as well as substantially, capitalist, while China was moving in fact and function
toward capitalist arrangements but clinging ideologically, in rhetoric as well as in
many policy choices, to socialism. Originally, following the rhetoric of Deng, it
officially claimed that it was pursuing a "socialist market economy."
No one has yet demonstrated conclusively that one cannot combine
market pricing with socialist planning or that the public ownership of the means
of production is not absolutely requisite to socialist claims. China seemed to try
to pursue reform without any clear understanding of the boundaries of the
socialist order that it was reforming. Its efforts proved to be amazingly
successful if its annual rate of growth is a proper measure.88 In 2000, it finally
joined the World Trade Organization, thereby becoming intricately entangled in
the world capitalist order. At about the same time, however, the leadership
continued to be concerned about economic inequalities, not only those based on
reformed economic arrangements, but those springing from differing degrees of
regional development, with Western China lagging behind."
The differences between the Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe) and China
in adopting and reforming socialism are numerous, as are the cultural
characteristics of these great nations upon which socialism was imposed. The
Soviet Union had been subject to a socialist regime much longer than China
(since 1917 in the case of the Soviets and since 1949 in the case of China) and,
presumably, the patterns of thought and behavior associated with socialism were
more deeply imbedded in Russia.
In China .

. . ,

the market never ceased to exist. At the height of central

planning in China, the state controlled the production and distribution of
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only 500 products. The corresponding figure in the Soviet Union was over
20,000! Even for these 500 products, enterprises had developed an elaborate
system of trading their above-plan output among each other. By the time
economic reform came to industry in 1985, this had been institutionalized
[sic] into semi-annual buyers' conferences where bewilderingly complex
deals were regularly arranged.. . . Thus when reform came, China had both
a substantial body of private and collective entrepreneurs, and a reservoir of
experience with the market mechanism. 90
Even before the 1917 Revolution, Russian agriculture had not been truly private,
but the mir, the village commune, had been dominant. The collective and the
state farm system under the Soviets had been one of the notorious weaknesses
of its socialist system. In China, by contrast, collective agriculture had shrunk to
the family farm (household responsibility system) in the early 1980s." Thus,
early in the transitional process Chinese reform moved significantly ahead of the
Soviets. But even de-collectivization of agriculture was imposed across the
whole of China only after it had been tested in selected areas first. This illustrates
the gradualist approach that was mentioned earlier and contrasts with shock
therapy as it came to the Soviet Union.9 2
One other aspect of the Chinese economic situation that differs markedly
from the corresponding state of affairs in the former Soviet Union involves the
place of manufacturing in the economy. China is now one of the foremost
manufacturers in the world and is a major supplier of manufactured consumer
goods to the US and many other countries.93 By comparison, the Soviet Union
before reform had great difficulty meeting quality standards in manufacturing
necessary to become a significant factor in international trade. The Soviets'
principal exports were raw materials-mainly oil and natural gas.94 China is not
nearly as rich in natural resources as the Soviets, so it could hardly expect to
compete in the export of extracted materials." However, as indicated, China
more than compensated through export of manufactured products. Among
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other things, manufactured products are not nearly as sensitive to international
price trends as raw commodities-a factor that contributed to the Soviet
economic troubles of the late 1980s. In this respect, the Chinese economy seems
more balanced in some fundamental respects than the Soviet economy. Granted,
the Chinese were not as "advanced" or as industrialized as the Soviets. Thus, the
Chinese economy remained more agricultural and less industrial simply because
it had been less developed. But, in some respects, it probably can be regarded as
more balanced and this may have helped it move beyond a more primitive
socialism.
But the single most obvious distinction between the Soviet and the
Chinese experience, of course, relates to politics rather than economics. The
Communist Party is firmly in charge of economic developments in China while
in Russia something resembling Western democracy prevails. One would
hesitate to say that parliamentary democracy has become firmly entrenched in
Russia, but what prevails there is an imperfect Western-style democracy rather
than a one-party Leninist state. But China remains an authoritarian state with a
socialist economy undergoing reform, which seems to be moving it toward
capitalism although it retains socialist characteristics.
All this contradicts what had been the conventional wisdom several years
ago. It was once widely held that reform in the direction of capitalism was
enhancing the freedom of the society and exerting pressure toward more
openness of the political system. The movement toward capitalism in China has
continued but the society has exhibited no movement toward greater openness.
In the Soviet circumstances, on the other hand, Gorbachev's reform efforts
included both the economic and the political and, in fact, glasnost ("openness"),
was one of his watchwords. So the Soviet system eventually liberalized both
economically and politically at more or less the same time. In China, on the
other hand, Deng-who strongly advocated economic reform-was also a
strong proponent of a firm hand in repressing the revolt that flared at
Tiananmen Square." Since that episode, there have been events that suggested
some political liberalization, but also other developments that suggest the
reverse." Certainly, there has been no observable movement away from oneparty authoritarianism, and experiments in democracy have been confined to the
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provincial and local level. Nothing has occurred to suggest that an authoritarian
regime was incompatible with an economy that offered an increasingly large role
to the market.'0 0
This state of affairs may provide a lesson for Gorbachev and others
attempting to reform socialist economies. For reform proceeded successfully in
China with very little change in the governing political structure. More
importantly, there may be a question for the US and other politically liberal
capitalist countries. Until now, it has been assumed that capitalism is the natural
economic arrangement fitting comfortably with a liberal democratic political
structure. But if China, a Leninist state, can surpass the West in some of the
most currently conspicuous measures of capitalist success, what does this mean
for the future of liberal democracy? Of course, the US remains in the lead with
an economy twice the size of China's and a per capita GNP that is seventeenfold greater.' 0 ' But China is rapidly closing the gap by, for example, enduring the
current setback in the global economy without registering negative growth and
while maintaining extraordinary, if not sensational, positive growth. Moreover,
China's public debt is less than one-third that of the US, which is almost twothirds of its GNP. In light of these data, to put the matter bluntly: are we
Americans too ill-disciplined to compete with an economy governed by
authoritarians? China seems to have emerged from the recent (or current)
downturn of the world economy in much healthier economic condition that the
US or other Western democracies. If this is the case, it may be in part because its
government has dealt more effectively with the conditions causing the decline.
The decline may be in part a negative commentary on the ability of popular
democracy to manage a problematic economy.
We, of course, competed for years with a socialist economy under
authoritarian management (which we called Communism). We seem to have
been successful in that competition. But now we are competing with a reformed
socialist economy (that increasingly resembles capitalism) also under
authoritarian management. What are our prospects in that competition? I hasten
to add that I do not believe that we should scrap the Constitution in favor of a
police state, but Chinese success in practicing a reformed socialism should give
us pause. It certainly means that we must be more disciplined in the regulation
of our economy, and it may well mean that there must be a larger governmental
management element in the way we approach economic matters. There must be
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a stronger artificial aspect to our economic arrangements and less reliance on
what we think of as natural. The idea that the unguided market will always
produce the best result simply does not square with the success of the Chinese
reformed socialist state. Authoritarianism may not be the order of the day, but I
think a larger role for government is.
V. ECONoMIC DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATES
This brings us to a brief review of how the economic decline in the
capitalist world (and specifically in the US) compares with developments in what
was, and to some extent continues to be, the socialist world. The downturn of
Western economies began with a global credit crisis: a drying up of credit such
that borrowed funds became generally unavailable, even to potential debtors
having the highest credentials.1 02 The roots of the crisis lay in over-leveraging:
too much debt was incurred and, in particular, too much low-quality debt
carrying a high risk of default. For example, consider the subprime mortgage, an
extension of credit to purchasers of homes having credit ratings below what
would normally be required.0 o Mortgage bankers would extend such loans at the
local level. Numerous such loans would then be packaged and sold as mortgagebacked securities to other credit institutions (in a process called securitization)
thus mobilizing extensive credit resources in the process of home financing.
One form of mortgage-backed security was the so-called collateralized debt
obligation and the process of securitization was generally welcomed as a means
of spreading risk on a national and international basis.' 04 However, remote
financers, distant by several credit transactions from the local extender of home
credit, received no notice that the mortgage-based securities that they had
acquired might carry an unusually high risk of default. Risk of default thus
spread extensively through the financial system but could not be easily identified,
and it eventually led to a freezing of credit.'0 s These problems were exacerbated
by the extensive use of credit derivatives-credit default swaps and other credit
derivatives-originally as insurance against default, but eventually as creating
their own unanticipated and unknown risk.'0o
It is of some interest to compare the specific problems that afflicted the
US's economy with those affecting China. As noted, the US endured a banking
(credit) crisis closely related to a housing (mortgage) crisis, associated with falling
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housing prices. China was not afflicted with either of these specific problems.
Among other things, its banks were owned by the government and were
required to lend, so there could be no comparable credit freeze. And the
monetary authorities had not driven down interest rates to stimulate housing
activity and to raise housing prices. China was not affected by these specific
problems but its export-driven economy was slowed by the worldwide recession.
Another major source of instability in the economy of the US and other
capitalist countries was a general inadequacy of reserves to back the vast
proliferation of debt and pursuit of leverage-leverage being defined as the ratio
of debt to equity in any particular enterprise. Inadequacy of reserves seemed to
be a general problem throughout the banking system and related financial
enterprises-such as insurance. Debt ratios in some investment banks had
grown as high as 30:1.0' This, of course, made such key institutions vulnerable
to unexpected financial demands, such as those resulting from debt defaults.'o
In part, this financial crisis was the product of the reaction to an earlier
crisis-the "dot-com" bubble.' 9 In the 1990s, the stocks of companies related
to computers and to the Internet had risen to fantastic levels, and the
subsequent collapse left the economy in shambles. In order to alleviate the
ensuing downturn, the monetary authorities lowered interest rates to minimal
levels, thereby triggering a boom based on housing and construction. 0 Housing
prices had risen rapidly and homeowners were encouraged to borrow more
heavily on their homes, increasing the amount of consumer debt that was
secured by inflated real estate values. Thus, the consequences of one bubble had
been "cured" by the creation of another bubble-the housing bubble."' The
second bubble is seen as a cure for the economic malaise that arose in the wake
of the bursting of the earlier bubble. This phenomenon is to be distinguished
from a normal and natural feature of capitalism-the business cycle. The
business cycle is not devised by monetary authorities as a cure for economic
malaise, but is characterized by the cyclical over-expansion of inventories and
their subsequent liquidation as demand accelerates and slows, and is
accompanied by fluctuation of prices. The business cycle is thus not an artificial
107
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response to economic ailments but a natural rhythm of business, which can
perhaps be modified but would be very difficult to eliminate, even if elimination
were desirable." 2
Actually, the measures invoked by government to deal immediately with
the recession in the US were similar to those put in force in China. A stimulus
package was brought to bear in both countries involving the spending of large
sums of money on various projects to improve the infrastructure and otherwise
as a means of broadly increasing demand and creating jobs. In the US, there was
also a program to provide funds for banks and other financial institutions in
danger of failure. This was a measure not needed in China, where the
government owned these institutions and guaranteed their solvency.
Several factors are involved in the vulnerability of capitalism to
destabilizing events and trends. One of these is the absence or inadequacy of
regulation. Regulation is the intervention of government in the workings of the
economy and, of course, is inconsistent with the reliance of a thoroughly
capitalist economy on market forces to maintain stability. The balance of
government regulation and market forces is well illustrated in the role of
mortgages in the housing market. For example, the role of subprime
mortgages-so prominent in the recent downturn-demonstrates how
government regulation may be necessary as an aid to or corrective of market
forces. The risk of loss inherent in lending mortgage money to bad risks or on
terms unlikely to be honored should in theory deter these practices. But in
practice, the belief that property values could only rise seemed to drive caution
from the minds of participants in these markets, and it may be time to legislate
against engaging in excessively risky mortgage practices. Whatever regulation has
previously been applied to mortgage practices has probably been designed to
loosen lending standards, to make credit more broadly available rather than to
avoid excessively risky practices. But now the time may have arrived to use
regulation to avoid risk."'
In any event, the typical capitalist faith in the "invisible hand" of the
market has been shaken by recent events and the door has been opened to more
and stricter regulation. Those who adhere to the gospel of the free market will
protest that excessive regulation will stifle the creative impulses of capitalism and
in the end attach an anchor to economic growth. Here, however, there must be
balance. Capitalism is characterized by creative destruction but it is inevitably
also threatened by instability, and some middle course must be sought between
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these tendencies.' 14 Another inevitable problem of capitalism is inequality. The
free market left to its own devices tends to pile up rewards for the already
rewarded; the rich become richer."s This is not only the talents of the successful
tending to be displayed again and again as the game continues and wealth flows
to the talented acquirers who have become wealthy; there is also something in
the workings of the market itself which tends to bring its fruits to those who
have won them in the past. Under capitalism, government must therefore act to
restore equality. Thus, through taxation, access to welfare benefits and
otherwise, government seeks to remedy the inequalities of capitalism by the
redistribution of the wealth, frequently mild and occasionally severe." 6
This leads us to an effort to draw lessons from a comparison of the
respective economic events and developments that we have described. What
conclusions may be drawn from the wrenching demise of socialism in Russia,
the apparently robust survival of something called socialism in China, and the
decline and severe wounding of capitalism in the US and in the West? Of course,
as we have seen, all these phenomena were so unlike one another that
comparisons may be of limited value, but I think some observations are in order
and can be illuminating.
For example, socialism and the regime that maintained it in Russia were
started on the road to extinction by the conscious design of a leader legitimately
emerging from the system-an ultimate insider. Gorbachev's policy was drawn
from some dissatisfaction with the recent slowing rate of growth of the Soviet
economy (although growth had not been a long-term problem) and perhaps by a
degree of disapproval of the arbitrary nature of Soviet politics. But Gorbachev
certainly did not have in mind the death of socialism when he undertook
perestroikaand glasnost. Quite the contrary. He intended to reform and to preserve
socialism in a purer form and in a democratic setting."' But the reforms he
pursued helped to unleash forces that eventually brought socialism to an end.
And to some extent (but this remains, to various degrees, arguable), the reforms
themselves produced unfortunate economic effects that eventually hastened the
decline into what eventuated as capitalism. To some degree, both in the former
See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democrag 84 (George Allen & Unwin 1976)
(describing capitalism as an economic ideology characterized by creative destruction); A Spedal
Report on the World Economy: Taming the Beast, The Economist 66 (Oct 11, 2008) (discussing the
question of whether modern finance is inherently unstable).
115 Consider Paul Krugman, For Richer How the Permissive Capitaism of the Boom Destroyed American
Equalit, NY Times Magazine 62 (Oct 20, 2002).
114

116 Aslund, Russia's Capitalist Revolution at 52 (cited in note 30).
117 See Yakovlev, Russia: The Strugglefor a Constitution, at 283-84 (cited in note 18); Aslund, Gorbachev's
Struggle for Economic Reform at 182-87 (cited in note 7); Kotz and Weir, Revolution from Above at 152
(cited in note 4).
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Soviet Union and in China, the emphasis of reform came to be placed on the
restoration of the market as the central device for the management of the
economy. Underlying the movement toward reform was some kind of idea that
socialism could survive (and be improved) with a greatly enhanced role for the
market. In the end, this idea proved to be a sort of squaring of the circle. The
market could be flirted with and given a part and ultimately became a sort of
salvation. But in the end it proved subversive and very hard to digest in a system
still capable of being called socialist.'
The immediate, and to some extent continuing, verdict on the Soviet
collapse was that it showed that socialism was no longer a plausible factor in
world economic thinking-leaving capitalism without rival. Socialism had lost
and capitalism had won. As Judge Posner has put it: "[Capitalism] will survive
because there is no alternative that hasn't been thoroughly discredited. . . .""'
But the ringing confidence with which such verdicts could once be pronounced
has been muted by the present difficulties of the capitalist world. Inequality-the
great blight of even successful capitalism-and unemployment-the bane of
capitalism in decline-remain as reminders that capitalism is not paradise and
leaves some thinkers still hankering after socialism. To many of the hankerers,
the answer is democratic socialism, socialism without Lenin. This presumably
would provide the full employment of the Soviet state but without the horrors
of the police state. But the Chinese experience may be an obstacle to this
thinking. The Soviets sought to reform socialism while loosening the bonds of
the authoritarian state. Their path was rough and their progress halting. Their
country was shaken to its roots before they emerged with imperfect capitalist
arrangements.1' The Chinese, on the other hand, undertook reform, imposed
from the top but under firm authoritarian control throughout.
Whatever may be said about China from a broader humanitarian viewpoint
(and here a more critical outlook is certainly in order), its political approach
more successfully negotiated economic change while maintaining growth than
did the Soviets. To the extent China may be said to have preserved a socialist
element in its economy, the controlling role of its government in economic
affairs must probably be recognized as the most prominent remaining feature of
socialism. It is significant that the people in charge are members of the
Communist Party and in principle, if not in practice, advocates of socialism. In
Russia, on the other hand, something resembling parliamentary democracy
118 Aslund, Gorbachev'rStrugglefor Economic Reform at 59-67 (cited in note 7).
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Posner, A Failureof Capitalismat 234 (cited in note 2). But see Kotz and Weir, Revoludon from Above
at 234-35 (cited in note 4) (arguing that a "distorted version of socialism, not socialism per se"
failed).
See Kotz and Weir, Revolutionfrom Above at 224-35 (cited in note 4).
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prevails. But whatever remains of socialism is hard to recognize, although some
remnants may perhaps be found.
In modern times, socialist sentiment is expressed primarily in advocacy of
social democracy, the preference for the welfare state. This involves the
provision of benefits to cushion the hardships of industrial society, such as
illness and unemployment. Universal health insurance is widely provided and
long-term unemployment insurance is a standard offering. Education is widely
available and within economic reach. Welfare state benefits are broadly provided
in Western Europe and provide a fairly sturdy social safety net.121 This sort of
social security is entirely consistent with political democracy and this
combination of economic and political arrangements generally prevails in
Europe. 122 These arrangements preserve the egalitarian aspirations of socialism
and go a long way toward meeting the security assurances associated with
socialist thinking.1 23 The welfare state, of course, does not meet the principled
demands of socialist thinking. 124 The means of production may not be publicly
owned, and the economy may not be extensively planned. 125 But the
redistribution of wealth and income is a serious goal of government policy.126
This seems to mean that pre-Marxist ideas of socialism have survived better than
class warfare, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the labor theory of value and
other specifically Marxist concepts.
The economic debate in the US still revolves around the desirability of
extensive welfare provisions and the other features of social democracy and, of
course, the sort of taxation that has to accompany them. Hard-core
conservatives resist these notions with passion1 27 and cherish the view that
Europe will not experience real prosperity until it rejects what they regard as
curbs upon economic growth. 128 People of this view may have been dismayed

121 See, for example, Economics Focus: Votingfor Welfare, The Economist 100 (June 2, 2001).
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when welfare-state economies proved somewhat more resilient in the face of the
economic turndown than economies not undergirded with a protective net.
Presumably, the provision of income and benefits for the needy protected
society against the worst ravages of an economic slowdown. As indicated, the
welfare state implemented the aspirations and concerns of socialism without
putting the validity of its theoretical underpinnings to the test. How far
capitalism may stray from its ideal form in the direction of welfarism without
losing its dynamism will remain the subject of debate, but it is fair to say that
some form of social democracy is as close to socialism as any economy is likely
to get in the near future.
Perhaps, the most interesting question at the moment is the future of the
Chinese economy and its role as a model for others. Its present success is so
dramatic that others may well seek to emulate it. Whether emulation will include
adoption of Leninist one-party government may be questionable. But that
question is likely to be raised by aspiring imitators. In the perspective of history
it may turn out that China is driven by factors which we have not subjected to
scrutiny and which are unique to China for reasons currently unperceived. It is
likely that in the long run China will not practice classical capitalism or classical
socialism but will follow a path of its own, subject both to government guidance
and to the unseen hand of the market. A central concern of the Chinese state
has always been the need to keep the nation together and to avoid
fragmentation, particularly in the uniquely Chinese form of warlordism. As far as
government is concerned, it is likely that China will be influenced as much by its
fear of fragmentation as by the needs of its economy. This concern suggests a
strong central government, whatever else may be involved. That much is
probably foreordained.
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus, the effort of the Soviet Union, the socialist pioneer, to transform its
economy led immediately to disaster and eventually to a diminished role as a
power and to abandonment of the socialist creed. Similar efforts by a socialist
China moved it from the status of "Sick Man of East Asia" to economic
preeminence and potentially to dramatic enhancement as a power and even to
cultural leadership in the world. Meanwhile, the leadership of the US in almost
all areas was compromised by an unforeseen failure of regulated capitalism.
The ruling ideologies of these major powers gave few clues of their fates in
the process of change. Both leading socialist powers were engaged in transition
giving a greater role to the market, but China moved in a way under firm
Apr 30, 2010) (decrying the democrats' "goal of moving the country towards a European-style
socialist welfare state model").
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political control, while the Soviets pursued contemporaneous political change
and their course wavered as a consequence. Beyond this, however, there is
reason to believe that China was better prepared by experience to adopt a larger
role for the market than the Soviet Union. At the same time, the US, the leading
capitalist power, with a relatively unregulated market economy, demonstrated
the inherent flaws of that approach by falling into a credit crisis and a
consequent major recession. All in all, the path to future dominance seems, for
the moment, to lie in China.
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